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FIPS 202 also supports a flexible scheme for domain separation between different functions derived from KECCAK-the algorithm [2] on which the SHA-3 Standard is based. Domain separation ensures that different named functions (such as SHA3-512 and SHAKE128) will be unrelated. cSHAKE-the customizable version of SHAKE-extends this scheme to allow users to customize their use of the function, as described below.
Customization is analogous to strong typing in a programming language; such customization makes it extremely unlikely that computing one function with two different customization strings will yield the same answer. Thus, two cSHAKE computations with different customization strings (for example, a key fingerprint and an email signature) are unrelated: knowing one of these results will give an attacker no information about the other.
This Recommendation defines two cSHAKE variants, cSHAKE128 and cSHAKE256, in Sec. 3, based on the KECCAK[c] sponge function [3] defined in FIPS 202. It then defines three additional SHA-3-derived functions, in Secs. 4 through 6, that provide new functionality not directly available from the more basic functions. They are:
• KMAC128 1 and KMAC256, providing pseudorandom functions (PRFs) and keyed hash functions with variable-length outputs; • TupleHash128 and TupleHash256, providing functions that hash tuples of input strings unambiguously 2 ; and • ParallelHash128 and ParallelHash256, providing efficient hash functions to hash long messages more quickly by taking advantage of parallelism in the processors.
All four functions defined in this Recommendation-cSHAKE, KMAC, TupleHash, and ParallelHash-have these properties in common:
• They are all derived from the functions specified in FIPS 202.
• All the functions except cSHAKE are defined in terms of cSHAKE.
1 KMAC stands for KECCAK Message Authentication Code. 2 TupleHash processes a tuple of one or more input strings, and incorporates the contents of all the strings, the number of strings, and the specific content of each string in the calculation of the resulting hash value. Thus, any change (such as moving bytes from one input string to an adjacent one, or removing an empty string from the input tuple) is extremely likely to lead to a different result.
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• All support user-defined customization strings.
• All support variable-length outputs of any bit length. KMAC, TupleHash, and ParallelHash have the additional property that any change in the requested output length completely changes the function. Even with identical inputs otherwise, any of these functions, when called with different requested output lengths, will, in general, yield unrelated outputs.
• All support two security strengths: 128 and 256 bits.
These functions are detailed in the specific sections below. In addition, a method is specified in Appendix B to facilitate using these functions to produce output that is almost uniformly distributed on the integers {0, 1, 2, ..., R−1} for any positive integer R.
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Glossary
In this document, bits are indicated in the Courier New font. Bytes are typically written as twodigit hexadecimal numbers from the ASCII characters 0 through 9 and A through F, preceded by the prefix "0x". In binary representation, bytes are written with the low-order bit first, while in hexadecimal representation, bytes are written with the high-order digit first. E.g., 0x01 = 10000000 and 0x80 = 00000001. These bit-ordering conventions follow the conventions established in Sec. B.1 of FIPS 202. Character strings appear in this document in double-quotes. Character strings are interpreted as bit strings whose length is a multiple of 8 bits, consisting of a 0 bit, followed by the 7-bit ASCII representation of each successive character.
Terms and Acronyms
Bit A binary digit: 0 or 1.
CMAC
Cipher-based Message Authentication Code.
cSHAKE
The customizable SHAKE function.
Domain Separation
For a function, a partitioning of the inputs to different application domains so that no input is assigned to more than one domain.
eXtendable-Output Function (XOF)
A function on bit strings in which the output can be extended to any desired length.
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standard.
Hash Function A function on bit strings in which the length of the output is fixed. The output often serves as a condensed representation of the input.
HMAC Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code.
KECCAK
The family of all sponge functions with a KECCAK-f permutation as the underlying function and multi-rate padding as the padding rule. KECCAK was originally specified in [2] , and standardized in FIPS 202. A function that can be used to generate output from a random seed such that the output is computationally indistinguishable from truly random output.
Rate
In the sponge construction, the number of input bits processed per invocation of the underlying function.
SHA-3
Secure Hash Algorithm-3.
Sponge Construction
The method originally specified in [3] for defining a function from the following: 1) an underlying function on bit strings of a fixed length, 2) a padding rule, and 3) a rate. Both the input and the output of the resulting function are bit strings that can be arbitrarily long.
Sponge Function A function that is defined according to the sponge construction, possibly specialized to a fixed output length.
String
A sequence of bits.
XOF
See eXtendable-Output Function.
Basic Operations ⌈x⌉
For a real number x, ⌈x⌉ is the least integer that is not strictly less than x. For example, ⌈3.2⌉ = 4, ⌈−3.2⌉ = −3, and ⌈6⌉ = 6. 
Other Internal Functions
This section describes the string encoding, padding and substring functions used in the definition of the SHA-3-derived functions.
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Integer to Byte String Encoding
Two internal functions, left_encode and right_encode, are defined to encode integers as byte strings. Both functions can encode integers up to an extremely large maximum, 2 2040 −1.
left_encode(x) encodes the integer x as a byte string in a way that can be unambiguously parsed from the beginning of the string by inserting the length of the byte string before the byte string representation of x.
right_encode(x) encodes the integer x as a byte string in a way that can be unambiguously parsed from the end of the string by inserting the length of the byte string after the byte string representation of x.
Using the function enc8() to encode the individual bytes, these two functions are defined as follows:
1. Let n be the smallest positive integer for which 2 8n > x. 2. Let x 1 , x 2 ,…, x n be the base-256 encoding of x satisfying:
left_encode(x):
Validity Conditions: 0 ≤ x < 2 2040 1. Let n be the smallest positive integer for which 2 8n > x. 2. Let x1, x2, …, xn be the base-256 encoding of x satisfying:
As an example, right_encode(0) will yield 00000000 10000000, and left_encode(0) will yield 10000000 00000000.
String Encoding
The encode_string function is used to encode bit strings in a way that may be parsed unambiguously from the beginning of the string, S. The function is defined as follows:
encode_string(S):
Validity Conditions: 0 ≤ len(S) < 2 2040 
Return left_encode(len(S)) || S.
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As an example, encode_string(S) where S is the empty string "" will yield 10000000 00000000.
Note that if the bit string S is not byte-oriented (i.e., len(S) is not a multiple of 8), the bit string returned from encode_string(S) is also not byte-oriented. However, if len(S) is a multiple of 8, then the length of the output of encode_string(S) will also be a multiple of 8.
Padding
The bytepad(X, w) function prepends an encoding of the integer w to an input string X, then pads the result with zeros until it is a byte string whose length in bytes is a multiple of w. In general, bytepad is intended to be used on encoded strings-the byte string bytepad(encode_string(S), w) can be parsed unambiguously from its beginning, whereas bytepad does not provide unambiguous padding for all input strings.
The definition of bytepad() is as follows:
bytepad(X, w):
Validity Conditions: w > 0 
Substrings
Let parameters a and b be non-negative integers that denote a specific position in a bit string X. Informally, the substring(X, a, b) function returns a substring from the bit string X containing the values at bit positions a, a+1, ..., b−1, inclusive. More precisely, the substring function operates as defined below. Note that all bit positions in the input and output strings are indexed from zero. Thus, the first bit in a string is in position 0, and the last bit in an n-bit string is in position n−1.
substring(X, a, b):
return the empty string.
Else if b ≤ len(X):
return the bits of X from position a to position b−1, inclusive. 3. Else:
return the bits of X from position a to position len(X)−1, inclusive.
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Overview
The two variants of cSHAKE-cSHAKE128 and cSHAKE256-are defined in terms of the SHAKE and KECCAK[c] functions specified in FIPS 202. cSHAKE128 provides a 128-bit security strength, while cSHAKE256 provides a 256-bit security strength.
Parameters
Both cSHAKE functions take four parameters:
• X is the main input bit string. It may be of any length 3 , including zero.
• L is an integer representing the requested output length 4 
in bits.
• N is a function-name bit string, used by NIST to define functions based on cSHAKE.
When no function other than cSHAKE is desired, N is set to the empty string.
• S is a customization bit string. The user selects this string to define a variant of the function. When no customization is desired, S is set to the empty string 5 .
An implementation of cSHAKE may reasonably support only input strings and output lengths that are whole bytes; if so, a fractional-byte input string or a request for an output length that is not a multiple of 8 would result in an error.
When N and S are both empty strings, cSHAKE(X, L, N, S) is equivalent to SHAKE as defined in FIPS 202. Thus,
cSHAKE is designed so that for any two instances: cSHAKE(X1, L1, N1, S1) and cSHAKE(X1, L1, N2, S2), 3 When a string is specified to be "of any length" in this document, a theoretical limit (e.g., 2
2040 −1 bits) may apply. This limit is imposed by the integer encoding schemes left_encode and right_encode, defined in Sec. 2.3.1. Beyond this limit, the string cannot be encoded. In the remainder of this document, absurdly large limits like 2 2040 −1 bits will often be treated interchangeably with no limit at all.
NIST SP 800-185 SHA-3 DERIVED FUNCTIONS: CSHAKE, KMAC, TUPLEHASH, AND PARALLELHASH 8 unless N1 = N2 and S1 = S2, the two instances produce unrelated outputs. Note that this includes the case where N1 and S1 are empty strings. That is, cSHAKE with any customization is domainseparated from the ordinary SHAKE function specified in FIPS 202. sponge functions, respectively; the characters 00 in the Courier New font in these definitions specify two zero bits.
Using the Function-Name Input
The cSHAKE function includes an input string that may be used to provide a function name (N). This is intended for use by NIST in defining SHA-3-derived functions, and should only be set to values defined by NIST 6 . This parameter provides a level of domain separation by function name. Users of cSHAKE should not make up their own names-that kind of customization is the purpose of the customization string S, to be discussed in Sec. 3.5. Nonstandard values of N could cause interoperability problems with future NIST-defined functions.
Using the Customization String
The cSHAKE function also includes an input string (S) to allow users to customize their use of the function. For example, someone using cSHAKE128 to compute a key fingerprint (the hash value for a public key) might use: cSHAKE128(public_key, 256, "", "key fingerprint"), where "key fingerprint" is a customization string S.
Later, the same user might decide to customize a different cSHAKE computation for signing an email: cSHAKE128(email_contents, 256, "", "email signature"), where "email signature" is the customization string S.
The customization string is intended to avoid a collision between these two cSHAKE values-it will be very difficult for an attacker to somehow force one computation (the email signature) to yield the same result as the other computation (the key fingerprint) if different values of S are used.
The customization string may be of any length less than 2
2040
; however, implementations may restrict the length of S that they will accept.
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Overview
The KECCAK Message Authentication Code (KMAC) algorithm is a PRF and keyed hash function based on KECCAK. It provides variable-length output, and unlike SHAKE and cSHAKE, altering the requested output length generates a new, unrelated output. KMAC has two variants, KMAC128 and KMAC256, built from cSHAKE128 and cSHAKE256, respectively. The two variants differ somewhat in their technical security properties. Nonetheless, for most applications, both variants can support any security strength up to 256 bits of security, provided that a long enough key is used, as discussed in Sec. 8.4.1.
Parameters
Both KMAC functions take the following parameters:
• K is a key bit string of any length 7 , including zero.
• X is the main input bit string. It may be of any length, including zero.
• L is an integer representing the requested output length 8 
in bits.
• S is an optional customization bit string of any length, including zero. If no customization is desired, S is set to the empty string.
Definition
KMAC concatenates a padded version of the key K with the input X and an encoding of the requested output length L. The result is then passed to cSHAKE, along with the requested output length L, the name N ="KMAC" = 11010010 10110010 10000010 11000010 9 , and the optional customization string S. 
KMAC128(K, X, L, S):
newX = bytepad(encode_string(K), 168) || X || right_encode(L). 2. return cSHAKE128(newX, L, "KMAC", S).
7 Approved uses of KMAC require the length of K to be at least the required security strength, as discussed in Sec. 8.4.1. 
KMAC with Arbitrary-Length Output
Some applications of KMAC may not know the number of output bits they will need until after the outputs begin to be produced. For these applications, KMAC can also be used as a XOF (i.e., the output can be extended to any desired length), which mimics the behavior of cSHAKE.
When used as a XOF, KMAC is computed by setting the encoded output length to 0, as shown in right_encode (0) 
return cSHAKE256(newX, L, "KMAC", S).
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TupleHash
Overview
TupleHash is a SHA-3-derived hash function with variable-length output that is designed to simply hash a tuple of input strings, any or all of which may be empty strings, in an unambiguous way. Such a tuple may consist of any number of strings, including zero, and is represented as a sequence of strings or variables in parentheses like ("a", "b", "c",...,"z") in this document.
TupleHash is designed to provide a generic, misuse-resistant way to combine a sequence of strings for hashing such that, for example, a TupleHash computed on the tuple ("abc" ,"d") will produce a different hash value than a TupleHash computed on the tuple ("ab","cd"), even though all the remaining input parameters are kept the same, and the two resulting concatenated strings, without string encoding, are identical.
TupleHash supports two security strengths: 128 bits and 256 bits. Changing any input to the function, including the requested output length, will almost certainly change the final output.
Parameters
TupleHash takes the following parameters:
• X is a tuple of zero or more bit strings, any or all of which may be an empty string.
• L is an integer representing the requested output length in bits.
Definition
TupleHash encodes the sequence of input strings in an unambiguous way, then encodes the requested output length at the end of the string, and passes the result into cSHAKE, along with the function name (N) of "TupleHash" = 00101010 10101110 00001110 00110110 10100110 00010010 10000110 11001110 00010110, and the optional customization string S. 
TupleHash with Arbitrary-Length Output
Some applications of TupleHash may not know the number of output bits they will need until after the outputs begin to be produced. For these applications, TupleHash can also be used as a XOF (i.e., the output can be extended to any desired length), which mimics the behavior of cSHAKE.
When used as a XOF, TupleHash is computed by setting the encoded output length to 0, as shown in right_encode (0) The purpose of ParallelHash 10 is to support the efficient hashing of very long strings, by taking advantage of the parallelism available in modern processors. ParallelHash supports the 128-and 256-bit security strengths, and also provides variable-length output. Changing any input parameter to ParallelHash, even the requested output length, will result in unrelated output. Like the other functions defined in this document, ParallelHash also supports user-selected customization strings.
Parameters
ParallelHash takes the following parameters:
• X is the main input bit string. It may be of any length 11 , including zero.
• B is the block size in bytes for parallel hashing. It may be any integer such that 0 < B < 2 2040 .
Definition
ParallelHash divides the input bit string X into a sequence of contiguous, non-overlapping blocks, each of length B bytes, and then computes the hash value for each block separately. 
10 A generic parallel hash mode for other NIST-approved hash functions may be developed in the future. The function here (i.e., ParallelHash) is specifically based on cSHAKE, and thus, on KECCAK.
11 Where ⌈ len(X)/B ⌉ < 2 2040 and B is the block size in bytes as defined in Sec. 6.2. As specified in Footnote 2, NIST will treat such absurdly large limit as interchangeable with having no limit at all. cSHAKE is defined so that all the calls to the underlying KECCAK-f function [1] to accommodate the function name N and the customization string S will process an integer multiple of r bits, where r is the rate parameter. An implementation can precompute the result of processing this padded block of N and S with cSHAKE, and thus, will suffer no performance penalty when reusing the same choices of N and S in multiple cSHAKE executions. Since TupleHash and ParallelHash are defined in terms of cSHAKE, this same precomputation is available to implementations of those functions as well.
KMAC can precompute the result of processing N and S, and the result of processing the key K. Thus, KMAC128 using a fixed, precomputed customization string and key will process an input string as efficiently as SHAKE128.
Limited Implementations
The cSHAKE, KMAC, TupleHash, and ParallelHash functions are defined to accept a wide range of possible inputs (including unreasonably long inputs, and inputs involving fractional bytes), and to produce a wide range of possible output lengths. However, it is acceptable for a specific implementation to limit the possible inputs that it will process, and the allowed output lengths that it will produce.
For example, it would be acceptable to limit an implementation of any of these functions to producing no more than 65536 bytes of output, or to producing only whole bytes of output, or to accepting only byte strings (never fractional bytes) as inputs. Additionally, implementations intended for only a specific, limited use may further restrict the sets of inputs they will process. For example, an implementation of TupleHash256 used only to process a 6-tuple of strings, and always using a customization string of "address tuple", would be acceptable.
If it is possible for an implementation of one of these functions to be given a set of inputs that it cannot process, then the implementation shall signal an error condition and refuse to produce an output.
Exploiting Parallelism in ParallelHash
Specific implementations of ParallelHash are permitted to restrict their implementation to a small subset of the allowed values. For example, it would be acceptable for a particular implementation to only allow a single value of B if it were only expected to interoperate with another implementation that similarly restricted B to that same value.
ParallelHash can be implemented in a straightforward and reasonably efficient way even when only sequential processing is available. However, a much faster implementation is possible when each of the individual blocks of the message can be handled in parallel. The choice of block size B can have a huge impact on the efficiency of ParallelHash in this case. ParallelHash is designed so that any machine that can apply parallel processing can, in principle, benefit from that parallel processing. For example, a machine that can hash four blocks in parallel and a machine that can 
Different N and S Give Unrelated Outputs
Suppose that (n1, s1) and (n2, s2) are two name and customization string pairs, and either n1 ≠ n2, or s1 ≠ s2. Furthermore, suppose that q1 and q2 are the lengths of the requested output. Then, cSHAKE(X, q1, n1, s1) and cSHAKE(X, q2, n2, s2) can be treated as unrelated functions of X. That is, they can be treated as if they were two completely different functions, with output lengths q1 and q2, respectively. This means, for example, that:
• Keys k1 and k2, where k1 = cSHAKE(x1, q1, n1, s1), and k2 = cSHAKE(x2, q2, n2, s2), and both keys are derived from secret, but related, quantities x1 and x2, will not be susceptible to related key attacks (with complexity less than the claimed security strength of the cSHAKE function.) • Finding a collision such that cSHAKE128(x1, L, n1, s1) = cSHAKE128(x2, L, n2, s2) will require a computational complexity on the order of min(2 L/2 , 2
128
). Similarly, finding a collision such that cSHAKE256(x1, L, n1, s1) = cSHAKE256(x2, L, n2, s2), will require a computational complexity on the order of min(2 L/2 , 2
256
).
Because KMAC, TupleHash, and ParallelHash are derived from cSHAKE, they inherit these properties. Specifically:
• Each of these functions gives outputs unrelated to the outputs of any of the other functions. There is, for example, no relationship between the outputs of KMAC (for any set of inputs) and TupleHash (for any set of inputs).
• For any of these functions, using a different customization string gives an unrelated output.
Thus, if s1 ≠ s2, ParallelHash(X, B, L, s1) and ParallelHash(X, B, L, s2) are expected to have no particular relationship.
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Note that cSHAKE does not share this property . For q1< q2, cSHAKE(X, q1, N, S) is a prefix of  cSHAKE(X, q2, N, S) . This is a property that cSHAKE shares with SHAKE and other XOFs. This property is discussed in more detail in Appendix A.2 of FIPS 202.
Collisions and Preimages
All these functions support variable output lengths. The difficulty of an attacker finding a collision or preimage for any of these functions depends on both the claimed security strength and the output length.
A function like cSHAKE128, with a claimed security strength of 128 bits, may be vulnerable to a collision or preimage attack with 2 128 work regardless of its output length-a longer output does not, in general, improve its security against these attacks. However, a shorter output can make the function more vulnerable to these attacks. With an output of L bits, a collision attack will require min(2 L/2 , 2 128 ) work, and a preimage attack will require at least min(2 L , 2 128 ) work.
Guidance for Using KMAC Securely
For maximum flexibility and usefulness, the KMAC functions are defined for arbitrary-sized output lengths and key lengths (up to 2 2040 −1 bits). However, not all such output and key lengths are secure.
KMAC Key Length
The input key length is the parameter that is most straightforwardly translated into a security strength. Given a small number of known (MAC, plaintext) pairs, an attacker requires at most 2 len(K) operations to find the key K.
Applications of this Recommendation shall not select an input key, K, whose length is less than their required security strength. Guidance for cryptographic algorithm and key-size selection is available in [4] .
KMAC Output Length
The output length is another important security parameter for KMAC-it determines the probability that an online guessing attack will succeed in forging a MAC tag. In particular, an attacker will need to submit, on average, 2 L invalid (message, MAC) pairs for each successful forgery. Since L only affects online attacks, a system that uses KMAC for message authentication can mitigate attacks that exploit a short L by limiting the total number of verification failures allowed under a given key.
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When used as a MAC, applications of this Recommendation shall not select an output length L that is less than 32 bits, and shall only select an output length less than 64 bits after a careful risk analysis is performed.
To illustrate the security properties of KMAC for given parameter settings, Table 1 lists a few other approved MAC algorithms along with equivalent settings for KMAC as an example. Note that no truncation of the associated tags (i.e., the 128-bit tag for AES-CMAC, the 256-bit tag for HMAC-SHA256, and the 512-bit tag for HMAC-SHA512) is assumed in the listed algorithms, and that equivalent settings of different MAC algorithms do not result in the same output. 
